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A UNIFORM APPLICATION OF THE JOCK 
TAX: THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL 
ACTION 
 
NICK OVERBAY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
State taxation of nonresident professional athletes, commonly known as the 
“jock tax,” is foundationally constitutional,1 but the states’ arbitrary and  
selective enforcement of the jock tax has and will continue to lead professional 
athletes to challenge the constitutionality of the jock tax under the Commerce 
Clause, Dormant Commerce Clause, Due Process Clause, Privileges and  
Immunities Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause.  Congress needs to enact 
a uniform allocation method for states to follow when taxing nonresident  
professional athletes to eliminate the arbitrary and selective enforcement of the 
jock tax to ensure states’ application and enforcement of their jock tax is  
constitutional.  Further, a uniform allocation method would ease the  
administrative burden and compliance costs afforded to professional athletes.  
The Privileges and Immunities Clause2 generally restricts a state from  
levying higher tax rates against nonresidents than it imposes on residents;  
however, some taxes are imposed with the sole purpose to collect substantial 
amounts of revenue from a specific group of nonresidents.3  This is the primary 
reason that states impose the jock tax.4  While some states have constitutional 
restrictions on enacting and applying nonresident taxes, there is little constraint 
upon state legislatures when they enact a tax on nonresidents, which results in 
                                                     
* Nick Overbay is a J.D. Candidate at Marquette University Law School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
and is a candidate for the Sports Law Certificate from the National Sports Law Institute.  He  
attended the University of Minnesota–Twin Cities, where he earned a B.S. in Sport Management. 
1. See Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 (1920); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 
75 (1920). 
2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
3. David Schmudde, Constitutional Limitations on State Taxation of Nonresident Citizens, 1999 L. 
REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 95, 107 (1999). 
4. See Michael McCann, Pro Athletes Paid California $216.8 Million in 2012 Income Taxes, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 21, 2014), http://www.si.com/mlb/2014/07/21/california-professional-ath-
letes-taxes. 
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“offensive and economically counterproductive” nonresident taxation.5   
Because nonresidents are unable to vote against state legislators and are  
provided little opportunity to be heard in their complaint opposing nonresident 
taxes, nonresident “taxpayers’ only recourse against a tax which is laid on them 
without the benefit of complaint[] is found in the Constitution of the United 
States.”6  Since the existing constitutional protections available for nonresidents 
challenging taxes imposed by states against nonresidents have proven  
insufficient, and since states’ “taxation of nonresidents [has] become[]  
excessive[,] . . . it is imperative that new protections be developed, or the current 
constitutional analyses be amended.”7 
This Comment examines the constitutional validity of the jock tax and  
analyzes the reasons needed for congressional intervention to impose a uniform 
allocation method for states that levy a jock tax.  Part II discusses the history 
and background of states taxing nonresidents.  Part III examines the history of 
the jock tax, the states’ benefits from levying the jock tax, and the application 
methods used to determine the amount of tax liability owed to the visiting state 
by a nonresident professional athlete.  Part IV highlights the states’ targeted and 
selective enforcement, explains  the constitutional provisions involved with the 
enforcement of the jock tax, and discusess recent federal proposals to ease the 
burden of nonresident taxation.  Part V analyzes the significance of two Ohio 
Supreme Court cases, and how the rulings will affect the future application and 
enforcement of the jock tax.  Finally, Part VI illustrates how a uniform approach 
would alleviate the complexities and controversies involved with the states’  
application and enforcement of the jock tax.  
II. THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF STATES TAXING NONRESIDENTS 
In 1920, two cases were decided by the Supreme Court that firmly  
established the states’ ability to tax nonresidents on income earned and derived 
from sources within their respective state.8  In the first case, Shaffer v. Carter,9 
an Illinois resident received income from properties owned in Oklahoma.10   
Oklahoma imposed taxes against the entire net income derived from the  
properties, which the taxpayer challenged on constitutional grounds.11  The  
                                                     
5. Schmudde, supra note 3, at 97.  
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 97–98. 
8. Leslie A. Ringle, State and Local Taxation of Nonresident Professional Athletes, 2 SPORTS LAW. 
J. 169, 171 (1995). 
9. 252 U.S. 37 (1920). 
10. Id. at 45. 
11. Id. at 46. 
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taxpayer asserted the tax imposed by Oklahoma violated due process, denied 
nonresidents equal protection, burdened interstate commerce, and denied  
nonresidents of the privileges and immunities of Oklahoma citizens.12  
Addressing the due process claim, the Court emphasized its history of  
decisions that recognized “[t]he rights of the several States to exercise the  
widest liberty with respect to the imposition of internal taxes.”13 Further  
illustrating that due process was not violated, the Court stated: 
 
[J]ust as a State may impose general income taxes upon its own 
citizens and residents whose persons are subject to its control, 
it may, as a necessary consequence, levy a duty of like  
character, and not more onerous in its effect, upon incomes  
accruing to non[]residents from their property or business 
within the State, or their occupations carried on therein;  
enforcing payment, so far as it can, by the exercise of a just 
control over persons and property within its borders.14 
 
Relying on the “more onerous” language, the Court also found that neither 
the Equal Protection Clause nor the Privileges and Immunities Clause was  
violated by the tax imposed.15  Because Oklahoma had assumed no power to tax 
nonresidents’ income derived outside its jurisdiction, the tax was not more  
onerous in its effect as compared to Oklahoma residents.16  Thus, the tax  
assessed by Oklahoma was lawful because the Constitution “entitles [the  
taxpayer] to the privileges and immunities of a citizen, but no more; not to an 
entire immunity from taxation, nor to any preferential treatment as compared 
with resident citizens. It protects him against discriminatory taxation, but gives 
him no right to be favored by discrimination or exemption.”17 
 Similarly, in Travis v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co.,18 a nonresident 
corporation that conducted business in New York raised the constitutional 
claims of due process violations, privileges and immunities violations, interstate 
commerce clause violations, impairment of the obligation of contracts claims, 
and equal protection violations against the State of New York because the  
corporation, under New York income tax laws, was required to withhold the 
                                                     
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 51. 
14. Id. at 52 (emphasis added). 
15. See id. at 53, 55–56. 
16. See id. at 53, 56–57. 
17. Id. at 53. 
18. 252 U.S. 60 (1920). 
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taxes of its employees that were residents of Connecticut or New Jersey.19   
Relying on the propositions established in Shaffer, the Court noted that the State 
of New York has jurisdiction to assess a tax on “the incomes of non[]residents 
arising from any business, trade, profession, or occupation carried on within its 
borders . . . and that such a tax, so enforced, does not violate the due process of 
law provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.”20  However, there are more  
constitutional claims available for nonresident professional athletes that  
challenge a state’s jock tax; those claims are analyzed in Part IV(F) of this Com-
ment.  First, a background of the jock tax is provided to demonstrate why states 
began implementing such a tax and the complexities involved with applying and 
enforcing the jock tax. 
III. BACKGROUND OF THE JOCK TAX 
The jock tax is defined as “[t]he practice of making professional athletes 
pay to play, by reason of pro-rata application and enforcement of state and local 
income tax statutes upon non[]resident professional athletes who engage in  
athletic contests within the jurisdiction.”21  However, the jock tax is not limited 
to just the athletes, but is also imposed on the coaches, trainers, and team  
officials.22  Thus, the jock tax is a source-based tax rather than a resident-based 
tax23 because it requires professional athletes and other team members to pay 
income taxes in every city and state where they earn income.24  Though it is well 
established that states can tax nonresidents that have a sufficient nexus with that 
state,25 issues arise when states unfairly tax nonresidents.26 
The first instance of a nonresident professional athlete being specifically 
targeted by state tax law was found in a 1976 appeal brought by former San 
Diego Chargers punter, Dennis Partee, against the State of California  
challenging the amount of taxes he owed to California for the year 1968.27   
                                                     
19. Id. at 72, 74–75. 
20. Id. at 75. 
21. Kenneth H. Ryesky, Devil’s Dictionary of Taxation, 6 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 54, 66 (2005). 
22. See Elizabeth C. Ekmekjian et al., The Jock Tax Contest: Professional Athletes vs. the States – 
Background and Current Developments, 20 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 19, 20 (2004). 
23. Steven Pahuskin, Heads Up! Recent Federal and State Attempts to Address Nonresident Income 
Taxation Perpetuate Selective Enforcement and Unfairness of the “Jock Tax,” 64 TAX LAW. 961, 964 
(2011). 
24. Jock Taxes, TAX FOUND., http://taxfoundation.org/tax-topics/jock-taxes (last visited Dec. 15, 
2016).   
25. See Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 57 (1920); see also Travis, 252 U.S. at 77. 
26. See Schmudde, supra note 3, at 98.  
27. What Is the “Jock Tax”?, TAXABALL, http://www.taxaball.com/what-is-the-jock-tax.html (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2016). 
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However, with the escalation of professional athletes’ salaries in the 1980s, 
states began to pursue and tax nonresident professional athletes more heavily.28  
The jock tax received more publicity and became popular in 1991 after the  
Chicago Bulls defeated the Los Angeles Lakers in the National Basketball  
Association (NBA) Finals.29  California subjected the players on the Chicago 
Bulls’ roster to pay state income tax against the salary earned for the time spent 
in California during the entire 1990-91 NBA season.30  
In response, Illinois enacted its own version of the jock tax, but only levied 
the tax against visiting professional athletes who played for teams whose home 
state taxed professional athletes from Illinois.31  Illinois’s reciprocal taxing 
measure was designed to pressure states to eliminate the jock tax, but it instead 
created an inconsistent application.32  Thus, the states’ arbitrary enforcement 
and application of the jock tax was born.  
“Today, all [twenty] states with professional sports franchises and state  
income taxes have a jock tax.”33  The states excluded due to not having a state 
income tax are Florida, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington.34  Additionally, 
nine cities home to a professional sports franchise levy their own jock tax, which 
includes “visiting players and anyone who accompanies the team.”35 
A. The Benefits Provided to States by Implementing the Jock Tax 
The ease of identifying a professional athlete’s schedule has caused states 
to increase their enforcement efforts of the jock tax,36 and athletes’ high salaries 
have created a substantial amount of tax revenue for states.37  Typically, the 
funds received are put into general state coffers;38 however, some states use the 
                                                     
28. Richard R. DiFrischia, State and Local Taxation of Nonresident Athletes, 18 J. ST. TAX’N 120, 
121 (2000). 
29. Pahuskin, supra note 23, at 965. 
30. See id. 
31. Id. 
32. See Elizabeth C. Ekmekjian, The Jock Tax: State and Local Income Taxation of Professional 
Athletes, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 229, 235–37 (1994). 
33. Pahuskin, supra note 23, at 965. 
34. John DiMascio, The “Jock Tax”: Fair Play or Unsportsmanlike Conduct, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 
953, 958 (2007). 
35. Martin J. Greenberg, Jock Tax, GREENBERG L. OFF.: SPORT$BIZ (Mar. 6, 2015), 
http://www.greenberglawoffice.com/jock-tax. 
36. Alan Pogroszewski, When Is a CPA as Important as Your ERA? A Comprehensive Evaluation 
and Examination of State Tax Issues on Professional Athletes, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 395, 395 
(2009). 
37. See Luke Anderson, Taxing the Professional Athlete, EMPLOYER GROUP (Mar. 18, 2015), 
http://www.theemployergroup.com/taxing-professional-athlete. 
38. Mary Pilon, The Jock-Tax Man, NEW YORKER (Apr. 10, 2015), 
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revenue received from the taxation of nonresident professional athletes to fund 
state-specific projects and stadiums.39  Although recently repealed,40 Tennessee 
used the revenue received from its jock tax to support and fund the venues in 
which athletes played.41  Further, some state legislatures turn to nonresident 
sources of income in the form of taxes when attempting to fund the construction 
of new professional sport stadiums.42  For example, in 2012, Wisconsin captured 
$10.7 million in revenue from NBA athletes.43  Thus, with professional athletes’ 
income taxes expected to increase, especially NBA athletes because of the 
league’s revenue growth, the revenue received by Wisconsin from taxing  
nonresident professional athletes would support the $150 million state general 
obligation bonding for the Milwaukee Bucks’ new arena.44  Despite the current 
controversies surrounding the jock tax, the revenue received by the states is too 
substantial for the states not to enforce the taxation of nonresident professional 
athletes. 
B. Application of the Jock Tax 
 There are two important concepts to understanding the states’ practice of 
taxing nonresident professional athletes.  First, a state can tax income earned by 
nonresidents within its jurisdiction, even though these nonresidents have no  
representation within that state.45  Second, although an administrative burden 
exists on levying nonresident income taxation against sporadic visitors,  
professional athletes are easy targets because of their public schedules and their 
large salaries, creating an economic benefit that outweighs the administrative 
burden.46  These two concepts are the foundation for the jock tax’s existence.47  
To apply the first concept, it must be understood what portion of a  
professional athlete’s income is subject to the jock tax, and the allocation  
methods used to collect it.  The second concept requires a constitutional analysis 
to examine the arbitrary and targeted enforcement used by the states in applying 
                                                     
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-jock-tax-man. 
39. See Schmudde, supra note 3, at 102. 
40. Chris Stephens, Tennessee Jock Tax Finally Sacked, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 15, 2014),  
http://taxfoundation.org/blog/tennessee-jock-tax-finally-sacked. 
41. Pilon, supra note 38. 
42. Id. 
43. Don Walker & Patrick Marley, ‘Jock’ Taxes Paid by Bucks Would Cover $150 Million Arena 
Loan, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/jock-
taxes-paid-by-bucks-would-cover-150-million-arena-loan-b99390809z1-282721001.html. 
44. Id. 
45. DiMascio, supra note 34, at 955. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
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the jock tax. 
1. Income Subject to the Jock Tax 
The Internal Revenue Code defines gross income broadly to include “all 
income from whatever source derived.”48  A “professional athlete’s [gross  
income] portfolio includes wages, signing bonuses, performance bonuses, prize 
money, endorsements, royalties, license fees, personal appearance fees, gifts, 
and imputed interest on interest free loans.”49  However, cities and states levy 
the jock tax on a professional athlete’s personal service income.50  A  
professional athlete’s personal service income normally includes “wages,  
performance bonuses, and deferred compensation earned while within the  
taxing jurisdiction.”51  Most states exclude a professional athlete’s signing  
bonus from the athlete’s tax base because it is not considered personal service, 
but rather compensation for contracting with a team.52  Additionally,  
endorsement deals and public appearances are only taxed by an athlete’s home 
state.53 
An athlete’s personal service income “must be apportioned to the various 
sources where it is earned.”54  This apportionment requirement “is based on the 
principal that gross income for city and state tax purposes includes only that 
income from sources within the jurisdiction.”55  This means a professional  
athlete must actually perform services within a taxing jurisdiction to incur tax 
liability.56      
2. Allocation Methods Used To Apportion an Athlete’s Income 
Traditionally, states have used two methods to apportion a professional  
athlete’s income: the “duty-days” method and the “games-played” method.57  
Steps have been taken to alleviate the varying allocation methods used by the 
states.  These steps are further discussed in Part V of this Comment.   
                                                     
48. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2016); JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 39 (17th ed. 2013). 
49. Ekmekjian, supra note 32, at 231. 
50. Id. at 237. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 238. 
53. Anderson, supra note 37. 
54. Ekmekjian, supra note 32, at 238. 
55. Id. 
56. See id. 
57. Jeffrey L. Krasney, State Income Taxation of Nonresident Professional Athletes, 2 SPORTS LAW. 
J. 127, 136 (1995). 
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Nonetheless, a brief description of both the duty-days method and the  
games-played method will be given.   
i. Duty-Days Method 
The majority of states use the duty-days method.58  The duty-days method 
“allocates income using a ratio of the number of days an athlete is present in the 
taxing jurisdiction to the total number of days . . . that the athlete is required to 
work.”59  The duty-days method includes practices and meeting days.60  The 
duty-days method is “calculated as the percentage of duty-days spent in the  
respective state, compared to the total duty-days that athlete had that tax year, 
multiplied by the player’s salary.”61  Its formula is as follows: 
  
Income Earned in State X  = Yearly Salary × (Duty-Days Spent in State X 
÷ Total Duty-Days)62 
 
For example, assume LeBron James spends eight duty-days in California, 
and there are 200 duty-days in a NBA season. James’ yearly salary is  
approximately $33 million.63  When James plays in California, James is liable 
for California’s jock tax.  California takes the duty-days James spends in  
California (8 days) and divides by the number of duty-days in the season (200 
days).  California then takes the percentage of duty-days spent within its  
jurisdiction (4%) and multiplies it by James’ total NBA income ($33M) to  
calculate the portion of James’ income attributable to California ($1.32M).   
California then multiplies James’ income earned in California by its income tax 
rate (13.3%) to arrive at James’ jock tax bill of $175,560.  
ii. Games-Played Method 
Alternatively, the games-played method is “based on the ratio of  
games-played in a particular jurisdiction to the total games-played.”64  The 
games-played method excludes “practice, training, and preseason days.”65  Its 
                                                     
58. Greenberg, supra note 35. 
59. Krasney, supra note 57, at 136. 
60. Id. 
61. What Is the “Jock Tax”?, supra note 27. 
62. Id. 
63. LeBron James Contract, Salary Cap Details & Breakdowns, SPOTRAC, http://www. 
spotrac.com/nba/cleveland-cavaliers/lebron-james/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2016). 
64. Krasney, supra note 57, at 137. 
65. Pahuskin, supra note 23, at 965. 
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formula is as follows: 
 
Income Earned in State X  =  Yearly Salary × (Games-Played in State X ÷ 
Total Games) 
 
 For example, the City of Cleveland utilizes the games-played method to 
calculate the jock tax owed by professional athletes.  The Los Angeles Lakers 
played one game in Cleveland during the 2015-16 NBA season.66  Kobe  
Bryant’s salary for the 2015-16 NBA season was $25 million.67  To calculate 
Bryant’s jock tax bill for the City of Cleveland, Cleveland takes the total number 
of games played within its jurisdiction (1 game) and divides it by the total  
number of games in that NBA season (82 games).  Cleveland then takes this 
percentage (1.2195122%) and multiplies it by Bryant’s total income ($25M) to 
calculate the portion of Bryant’s income attributable to Cleveland ($304,878).  
Cleveland then multiples this attributable income by its income tax rate of 2% 
to reach Bryant’s jock tax bill of $6,097.56 owed to the City of Cleveland.   
Furthermore, this amount would then be added to the amount Bryant owes the 
State of Ohio, which uses the duty-days method. 
IV. SELECTIVE AND TARGETED ENFORCEMENT OF NONRESIDENT TAXATION 
Each of the fifty states has the sovereignty to create and establish its own 
taxing system.68  As such, the nonresident, interstate taxpayer faces a significant 
burden.69  States are extremely aggressive in taxing nonresidents, which results 
in states treating nonresidents worse than residents.70  Two main issues must be 
decided to determine “whether a statute taxing nonresidents violates  
constitutional protections.”71  “First, does the [C]onstitution require equal  
treatment of nonresidents and residents?  Second, how is equal treatment  
defined?”72  The equal treatment obligation is found in any of these three  
                                                     
66. Los Angeles Lakers 2016  Schedule – Lakers Home and Away, ESPN, 
http://www.espn.com/nba/team/schedule/_/name/LAL/year/2016/seasontype/2 (last visited Dec. 15, 
2016). 
67. Kobe Bryant Contract, Salary Cap Details & Breakdowns, SPOTRAC, http://www. 
spotrac.com/nba/los-angeles-lakers/kobe-bryant/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2016). 
68. Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation: When Will Congress Intervene?, 23 J. LEGIS. 171, 
171 (1997). 
69. Id. 
70. See Schmudde, supra note 3, at 111. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
OVERBAY 27.1 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/19/2016  6:04 PM 
226 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:1 
constitutional provisions: the Commerce Clause;73 the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment;74 and the Privileges and Immunities Clause.75  
All three clauses have an effect on the states’ application and enforcement of 
the jock tax.  Furthermore, potential challenges of a state’s jock tax exist under 
the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Brief descriptions of each constitutional provision will be  
provided to illustrate the complexities involved with the jock tax.  Further,  
potential challenges professional athletes can bring against the application of 
the jock tax will be explored. 
A. Commerce Clause  
The Commerce Clause provides that states may not discriminate against or 
excessively burden interstate commerce.76  As applied to taxation, “courts have 
interpreted this to mean that a state may not give advantages to its own citizens 
at the expense of non[]citizens.”77  “However, not all [state] discrimination 
against [nonresidents] will be found to be unconstitutional.”78  If a sufficient 
rationale exists for a state’s enactment of a discriminatory tax against  
nonresidents, with minimal burden placed on nonresidents, the tax is held to be 
constitutional.79  If nonresident taxpayers receive a tax credit from their home 
state for taxes paid to other states, no burden exists on those nonresident  
taxpayers.80  “The Commerce Clause is used to prohibit any state from  
interfering with commerce or impeding the operation of businesses on an  
interstate basis.”81  To escape this prohibition, a state’s rationale for a  
nonresident tax is that “the tax only increases a burden on a [nonresident]  
choosing to do business within the state.  It does not impose any restriction or 
burden on the [nonresident] doing business in any other state.”82  Additionally, 
a nonresident tax is limited to the business conducted within the state’s  
jurisdiction; therefore, “the tax is only imposed on ‘intrastate commerce,’ not 
‘interstate commerce.’”83 
                                                     
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
75. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.  
76. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
77. Schmudde, supra note 3, at 111. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 112. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
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In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,84 the Supreme Court “provided an 
analytical framework for determining the constitutionality of a state tax under 
the Commerce Clause.”85  For a state tax to be valid and not violate the  
Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court held that a state tax be “applied to an 
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, fairly apportioned,  
non-discriminatory against interstate commerce, and fairly related to the  
services provided by the State.”86  Prongs two, three, and four will not be  
addressed because each prong requires a separate, independent analysis for each 
state’s jock tax.   
The first prong of the provided framework, “substantial nexus,” has two 
sub-parts for state tax jurisdictions: “(1) nexus with the taxpayer and (2) nexus 
with the income, transaction, activity, or property sought to be taxed.”87   
However, there is uncertainty about the nexus required under the Commerce 
Clause.88  While the Supreme Court in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota89 addressed 
whether the physical presence by the taxpayer is the nexus needed for state sales 
and use tax, a taxpayer’s economic presence may be sufficient for nonresident 
income taxation.90  State courts are divided on the issue of which standard to 
apply, and the Supreme Court has yet to answer the question because “the  
Supreme Court’s exploration of the constitutional limits of income tax  
jurisdiction has been stymied by Congress’s enactment of legislation as an  
affirmative exercise of its Commerce Clause powers.”91  However, it is a  
reasonable inference that the nexus must be a “physical presence” based on the 
ruling by the Ohio Supreme Court in Saturday v. Cleveland Board of Review,92 
a case that is further discussed in Part VI of this Comment.  Nonetheless, states 
are still divided on which nexus applies to the taxation of nonresident  
professional athletes.  The states’ division necessitates congressional  
intervention to establish which nexus standard applies to states’ jock tax  
application to provide uniformity in the enforcement of the jock tax. 
                                                     
84. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
85. Alan Pogroszewski & Kari A. Smoker, Is Tennessee’s Version of the “Jock Tax”  
Unconstitutional?, 23 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 415, 421 (2013). 
86. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 279. 
87. Pogroszewski & Smoker, supra note 85, at 422. 
88. See id. 
89. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
90. Pogroszewski & Smoker, supra note 85, at 422. 
91. Id. at 422 n.44.  
92. 33 N.E.3d 46 (Ohio 2015). 
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B. Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . prohibits 
states from denying any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”93  However, the Equal Protection Clause does not protect against all  
discrimination in tax statutes.94  “It requires that any tax which discriminates 
against nonresidents be based upon a rational basis and not resort to arbitrary 
classifications.”95  Typically, courts use three standards of review to analyze 
laws under the Equal Protection Clause: (1) strict scrutiny; (2) intermediate 
scrutiny; and (3) rational basis. Strict scrutiny applies to “suspect  
classifications” such as race and religion.96  To pass strict scrutiny, the law must 
further a “compelling governmental interest,” and must be narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest.97  Intermediate scrutiny is used in equal protection  
challenges to gender classifications.98  To pass intermediate scrutiny, the law 
must further an “important government interest” by means substantially related 
to that interest.99  Rational basis is used when a law does not involve any  
fundamental rights or a suspect classification.100  To pass rational basis, the law 
must be “rationally related” to a “legitimate government interest.”101 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, rational basis applies to an analysis of 
the jock tax because residency is not a “suspect classification.”102  Additionally, 
because it is difficult to establish professional athletes as a “suspect class,”103 
courts will find a state’s jock tax constitutional if it has a “rational basis” to a 
“legitimate state purpose.”104  Here, the rational basis for the jock tax is to  
generate revenue from nonresident professional athletes to help offset the costs 
associated with hosting a professional sporting event.  
                                                     
93. Equal Protection, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/equal_protection (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2016). 
94. Schmudde, supra note 3, at 113. 
95. Id. 
96. Equal Protection, supra note 93. 
97. Id. 
98. See id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Joel Michael, Constitutional Restrictions on Taxation of Nonresidents, MINN. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/ss/clssnonr.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 
2016). 
103. Elaine S. Povich, Superstar Athletes Pay Big Jock Taxes in Some States, GOV’T EXEC. (Oct. 
26, 2014), http://govexec.com/state-local/2014/10/state-jock-taxes/97412/.  
104. Equal Protection, supra note 93. 
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C. Privileges and Immunities Clause 
There are two clauses within the United States Constitution that protect the 
privileges and immunities of citizens.  Article IV, Section 2 provides, “[t]he 
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of  
Citizens in the several States.”105  Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment  
provides, “[n]o [s]tate shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”106  Rather than the 
Equal Protection Clause, it is the Privileges and Immunities Clause that protects 
against discriminatory taxation levied against nonresidents.107  “The ‘fairness’ 
which nonresident taxpayers must receive from other states is guaranteed by the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.”108  This clause must provide “the  
constitutional guarantee of fairness” in states’ treatment of nonresidents because 
without that guarantee, nonresidents would be “fair game” for the taxing state, 
and such discriminatory taxation would lead to “border wars” between the 
states.109  An example of such border wars is illustrated by the action taken by 
the State of Illinois after California taxed the visiting members of the Chicago 
Bulls in 1991.  
D. Dormant Commerce Clause  
Pursuant to the Dormant Commerce Clause, states are not allowed to  
“discriminate against or burden the flow of interstate commerce.”110  “In the 
absence of congressional legislation regarding an area of commerce, the  
Supreme Court enforces the anti-economic protectionism purpose behind the 
Commerce Clause by striking down state discrimination against interstate  
commerce through the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine.”111  In a recent 
decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Maryland tax statutes that imposed a tax 
on the income of Maryland residents earned outside of the state’s jurisdiction 
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because Maryland did not offer its  
residents a full tax credit against the income taxes they paid to other states.112  
Therefore, if a professional athlete’s home state disallows a full tax credit for 
                                                     
105. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
107. Schmudde, supra note 3, at 115. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Morgan L. Holcomb, Tax My Ride: Taxing Commuters in Our National Economy, 8 FLA. TAX 
REV. 885, 897 (2008). 
111. Id. at 899. 
112. See Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015). 
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the income taxes paid to other states, and the home state imposes a tax on 100% 
of the professional athlete’s income, that state is in violation of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.  
E. Due Process Clause 
Another limitation on the states’ ability to tax is found in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Due Process Clause mandates that 
no state may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due  
process of law.”113  Since state taxation is a deprivation of property, it is subject 
to the Due Process Clause.  There are two principles that must be satisfied before 
a state can impose a tax upon a nonresident on income generated in interstate 
commerce.114  In Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, the Supreme Court established 
that before a state can enact a tax, there must be “some minimum connection[] 
between a state and the person, property[,] or transaction it seeks to tax.”115   
Further, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, the Supreme Court ruled 
that a tax must have “a rational relationship between the income attributed to 
the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise.”116 
Additionally, under the Due Process Clause, “a state is prohibited from the 
taxing, on an unapportioned basis, [of] property that was taxable in other states 
on an apportioned basis, otherwise taxation by two or more states of the same 
property would be unconstitutional.”117  This act is commonly known as “double 
taxation.”  Due process can be violated by the jock tax with the critical question 
being “whether the home state may tax all of the compensation that a  
nonresident athlete earns from his professional sports services, including  
income tax earned from services performed in other states.”118  Therefore, if a 
professional athlete’s home state disallows a full tax credit for the income taxes 
paid to other states, and the home state imposes a tax on 100% of the  
professional athlete’s income, that state is in violation of the Due Process 
Clause. 
                                                     
113. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
114. See Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 341 (1954); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of 
Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436–37 (1980). 
115. Miller Bros. Co., 347 U.S. at 345. 
116. Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 437. 
117. N. Anna Shaheen & Brent C. Estes, The Tax Collector Comes Knocking: An Evaluation of the 
State Income Taxation of Nonresident Professional Athletes and the Role of Congress, 15 J. LEGAL 
ETHICAL REG. ISSUES 131, 137 (2012). 
118. Id. 
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F. Professional Athletes’ Potential Challenges 
“Unfair taxation should be broadly defined to include any tax which has the 
practical effect of being targeted predominately at nonresidents.”119  There are 
three remedies available to nonresident professional athletes that are subject to 
a possible unfair jock tax.120  Professional athletes can: 
 
(1) look to the legislature to reduce or eliminate the tax; (2) 
bring suit in the hope that the judiciary will provide the  
protection of the equal protection clause and the privileges and 
immunities clause; and (3) demonstrate to the taxing state that 
nonresident taxation actually causes economic harm to the  
taxing state.121 
 
Generally, state courts have been the improper venue for a nonresident  
taxpayer to seek redress against what is perceived as an unfair tax because “state 
courts have given very little protection to nonresidents.”122  However,  
nonresident professional athletes can find redress in federal courts because  
federal courts will “reinforce the constitutional provisions guaranteeing fair 
treatment by a state of the citizens of another state.”123  Further, federal courts 
can deter the states’ aggressive nature of levying taxes against nonresidents.124 
Additionally, the remedy of looking to the legislature is generally  
ineffective unless the nonresident group is substantial enough to pressure  
legislators.125  Nonresident professional athletes are an exception to this  
generality. As previously mentioned, the State of Tennessee recently repealed 
its version of the jock tax because it was “constitutionally suspect.”126  The lead 
sponsor of the bill, Republican David Alexander,127 believed Tennessee’s jock 
tax to be unconstitutional because it exempted NFL athletes while National 
Hockey League (NHL) and NBA athletes were subjected to the tax.128   
However, even the repeal has drawn criticism because at the time the repeal 
                                                     
119. Schmudde, supra note 3, at 108. 
120. See id.  
121. Id. at 108–09. 
122. Id. at 108. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 109. 
126. Stephens, supra note 40. 
127. Nate Raunrau, Tennessee Legislature Abolishes Jock Tax, TENNESSEAN (Apr. 7, 2014), 
http://www.tennessean.com/story/money/2014/04/07/tennessee-house-abolishes-jock-tax/7440595/. 
128. Stephens, supra note 40. 
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took effect, NHL players were immediately exempted, but Tennessee still  
subjected NBA players to the tax for an additional two years.129  This fact can 
be contributed to the Memphis Grizzlies pressuring the Tennessee legislature 
because the revenue received from the tax went directly to the team to assist 
with the funding of arena upgrades and the hosting of additional events besides 
basketball games.130 
Lastly, the third remedy, showing economic harm, is likely to be  
unsuccessful for professional athletes because of the substantial amount of  
revenue each state pulls in from their enforcement of the jock tax.  For economic 
harm to be shown, “the tax must be higher than what is normally expected, and 
it must cause a change in consumer’s behavior to the extent that a local group 
becomes interested and to an extent that the legislature takes action.”131   
Typically, this remedy is utilized when a substantial tax is placed on hotel rooms 
or rental cars.132  Also, because every state’s jock tax rate must be equivalent to 
its resident income tax rate, professional athletes will be unlikely to satisfy this 
remedy.  
V. PAST EFFORTS TO RESOLVE NONRESIDENT TAXATION ISSUES  
States have begun to broadly apply nonresident income tax laws, which has 
led to increased compliance costs, complexity, and administrative difficulties.133  
As a result, Congress and the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) have  
introduced legislation to ameliorate these difficulties; however, both Congress 
and the MTC explicitly exclude athletes from their scope, “thereby perpetuating 
an unjust selective enforcement of nonresident income taxes on athletes.”134 
The Mobile Workforce State Income Tax Simplification Act of 2015 was 
introduced by Republican Mark Bishop, but has yet to be passed by the House 
of Representatives and the Senate.135  The purpose of this bill is to “limit the 
authority of States to tax certain income of employees for employment duties 
performed in other States.”136  Section 2(a)(2) of the bill preempts states from 
taxing nonresident employees that work within the state for less than thirty days 
                                                     
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Schmudde, supra note 3, at 109. 
132. See id. 
133. Pahuskin, supra note 23, at 970. 
134. Id. 
135. Mobile Workforce State Income Tax Simplification Act of 2015, H.R. 2315, 114th Cong. 
(2015).  
136. Id. 
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in a single year.137  However, athletes are not covered under this bill.138  Section 
2(d)(2) defines “employee,” but explicitly excludes “a professional athlete,  
professional entertainer, or certain public figures.”139  Thus, rather than solving 
the states’ targeted enforcement, compliance burdens, and unfairness of the jock 
tax, this action by Congress only enhances these controversies.  If this bill were 
to be passed, “Congress would be condoning states’ continued practice of  
selective enforcement against athletes.  Such selective enforcement violates a 
fundamental principle of taxation: neutrality.”140  Furthermore, the MTC also 
excluded “professional athletes and members of a professional athletic team” 
from its twenty-day de minimis model statute that it had recommended to  
“alleviate the burdens of nonresident taxation.”141 
However, the most significant effort to address and alleviate issues involved 
with the taxation of nonresident professional athletes came from the Federation 
of Tax Administrators (FTA).142  Sport franchises and players’ associations  
requested the FTA to intervene and address the differing methods used because 
of the complications and costs of complying with each state’s independent  
allocation method.143  In 1994, the FTA issued a report entitled State Income 
Taxation of Nonresident Professional Team Athletes: A Uniform Approach.144  
The report presented numerous issues faced by athletes, sport franchises, and 
state administrators including: 
 
(1) the compliance burden of filing numerous state and local 
tax returns; (2) inconsistent rules to govern apportionment of 
an athlete[’]s wages which may lead to multiple taxation of the 
same earnings; (3) burdens due to withholding and reporting 
requirements for teams; and (4) administering and enforcing 
compliance by state administrators and the treatment of athletes 
as compared to other taxpayers.145  
 
To resolve these issues, the FTA reviewed four alternatives: (1) Uniform 
Apportionment Formula; (2) Home State Apportionment; (3) Base State Model; 
                                                     
137. Id. 
138. See id. 
139. Id. 
140. Pahuskin, supra note 23, at 971. 
141. Id. 
142. See Ekmekjian et al., supra note 22, at 23. 
143. Pahuskin, supra note 23, at 966. 
144. Ekmekjian et al., supra note 22, at 23. 
145. Id. at 24. 
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and (4) Partnership Model.146  The Uniform Apportionment Formula would 
“provide for a consistent approach to the division of income by all states taxing 
nonresident team members.”147  Home State Apportionment would allow “team 
members [to] allocate income from the playing of all games to the state in which 
the team played its home games or otherwise maintained its primary  
facilities.”148  The Base State Model would allow professional athletes to satisfy 
tax return filings by filing a single tax return “with the state in which the team 
was domiciled, which state would, in turn, be responsible for providing the  
relevant information and funds to all other states involved.”149  The Partnership 
Model would allow the tax return filings to “be satisfied through a composite or 
consolidated return filed on behalf of all eligible team members.”150 
The FTA requested each state uniformly adopt the duty-days method to 
achieve “the fair treatment of the taxpayer, consistent taxation of the income, 
and a substantial reduction in difficulties involved in complying with state tax 
laws.”151  Ultimately, all states agreed to adopt the duty-days method152 with 
Massachusetts being the last state to adopt the duty-days method in 2002.153  
However, this proposal only applied to the states’ jock tax.  Cities were still able 
to implement their own allocation method when enforcing their jock tax.   
Nonetheless, two cases recently decided by the Ohio Supreme Court could have 
significant ramifications for establishing a uniform allocation method. 
VI. SIGNIFICANCE OF HILLENMEYER V. CLEVELAND BOARD OF REVIEW AND 
SATURDAY V. CLEVELAND BOARD OF REVIEW 
The Ohio Supreme Court recently decided, in Hillenmeyer v. Cleveland 
Board of Review154 and Saturday v. Cleveland Board of Review,155 that  
Cleveland’s version of the jock tax “violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution since it imposes an extraterritorial tax in violation of this clause.”156  
                                                     
146. Id. 
147. Id. (quoting JAMES W. WETZLER, FEDERATIONN OF TAX ADMINISTRATORS, STATE INCOME 
TAXATION OF NONRESIDENT PROFESSIONAL TEAM ATHLETES: A UNIFORM APPROACH 2 (1994)). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Pahuskin, supra note 23, at 966 (quoting JAMES W. WETZLER, FEDERATION OF TAX 
ADMINISTRATORS, supra note 147, at 3) (alteration in original). 
152. Id. 
153. Ekmekjian et al., supra note 22, at 24. 
154. 41 N.E.3d 1164 (Ohio 2015). 
155. 33 N.E.3d 46 (Ohio 2015). 
156. Brian Gallagher, Are States Taking ‘Jock Tax’ Too Far?, LAW360 (Aug. 26, 2015), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/694890/are-states-taking-jock-tax-too-far. 
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In its Hillenmeyer opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court stated,  
 
Due process requires an allocation that reasonably  
associates the amount of compensation taxed with work the  
taxpayer performed within the city . . . . By using the  
games-played method, Cleveland has reached extraterritorially, 
beyond its power to tax . . . . The games-played method reaches 
income for work that was performed outside of Cleveland, and 
thus Cleveland’s income tax violates due process as applied to 
NFL players.157 
 
 Under Cleveland’s games-played approach, a visiting football player who 
plays one game in Cleveland out of a twenty-game schedule would have 5% of 
his income allocated to Cleveland.158  However, under the duty-days method, 
the amount of income allocated to Cleveland for the same athlete would have 
been only slightly more than 1%.159  The court stated “the duty-days method 
properly includes as taxable income only that compensation earned in Cleveland 
by accounting for all the work for which an NFL player . . . is paid, rather than 
merely the football games he plays each year.”160  The court reiterated this point 
in its Saturday opinion when it stated “NFL players are contractually employed 
to provide services to their employers . . . including mandatory mini-camps, the 
official preseason training camp, meetings, [and] practice sessions.”161 
Furthermore, in its Saturday opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court not only  
addressed the games-played method used by the City of Cleveland, but also  
addressed the issue of Saturday being taxed despite his lack of physical presence 
in Cleveland.162  The court reiterated its proposition in Hillenmeyer that  
Cleveland’s use of the games-played method did not properly tax the income 
attributable to the work performed in Cleveland because it only considered 
games as employment services.163  The court determined that because Saturday, 
in performing rehabilitation for an injury, was engaged in employment services 
in Indianapolis and was not physically present in Cleveland for the game,  
Cleveland had no jurisdiction to tax Saturday for the income he earned on that 
day.  However, as previously mentioned in Part IV(A), under the Commerce 
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Clause, states are split on which nexus applies when taxing nonresident  
professional athletes.  
Nevertheless, the City of Cleveland has appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court 
contending that no court has ever held the games-played allocation method  
unconstitutional on any grounds.164  Because the Supreme Court rejected the 
City of Cleveland’s request for an appeal, the duty-days method is utilized by 
all states and cities to levy the jock tax.  This exemplifies another reason why 
congressional intervention is needed.  Rather than having uncertainty in which 
allocation method applies, Congress should enact legislation that requires every 
state and city to implement the duty-days method.  
VII. THE NEED FOR CONGRESS INTERVENTION TO CREATE UNIFORMITY 
 “[T]he multitude of tax systems amounts to a drag on interstate trade almost 
as debilitating as the border restrictions our federal system was originally  
designed to prevent.”165  Achieving a uniform allocation method for the jock tax 
would “reduce the states’ administrative costs and [professional athletes’]  
compliance costs.”166  Additionally, a uniform allocation method would  
eliminate the risk of double taxation on professional athletes’ income, promote 
efficiency, and decrease planning costs.167  Furthermore, a uniform allocation 
method would eliminate litigation and potential challenges by professional  
athletes.168 
A uniform allocation method can be achieved in one of three ways: “(1) by 
the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the [D]ormant Commerce 
Clause; (2) by the voluntary, joint action of the states; or (3) by congressional 
action.”169  However, Supreme Court precedent has established that it is “neither 
willing nor able to mandate uniformity in state and local taxation.”170  Thus, if 
a uniform allocation method is to be reached for jock tax enforcement, then “it 
must be through the voluntary, joint action of the states or congressional  
action.”171 
                                                     
164. Cleveland Appeals ‘Jock Tax’ Ruling to Supreme Court, ESPN (Oct. 7, 2015), 
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Even though the recommendation issued by the FTA succeeded in states 
agreeing to adopt the duty-days allocation method, concerns and controversies 
still exist as to the application of the duty-days method because “no two states 
calculate their jock tax exactly alike.”172  Though the states agree on using the 
duty-days method, and while state case precedent exists,173 the states do not 
agree on what constitutes a “duty-day.”174  While some jurisdictions treat  
practices and organized team activities as duty-days, other states do not.175  This 
creates an administrative nightmare for athletes in determining what their tax 
liability is for every state they visit.  Thus, unless the states voluntarily agree on 
what to include as a duty-day, administrative complications and sufficient  
compliance costs will continue to exist for both states and professional athletes.  
However, as opposed to the voluntariness of the states, congressional  
intervention is an easier and more efficient manner to ensure a uniform  
application method is reached. 
Congressional intervention is the best method to determine and develop a 
precise definition for duty-day.  This congressional action would allow more 
clarity to be provided and guarantee administration and enforcement of the jock 
tax are less burdensome on both states and professional athletes.  Also, Congress 
can ensure every state’s jock tax conforms to the constitutional restrictions  
involved with the taxation of nonresidents, thereby eliminating potential claims 
and litigation.  
VIII.     CONCLUSION 
States’ enforcement of the jock tax is not likely to disappear anytime soon.  
The revenue received is too significant.  Therefore, the states’ application and 
enforcement efforts must be addressed.  Because nonresident professional  
athletes are unable to challenge a state’s jock tax until after it has been  
implemented, there is often harm caused, and the available remedies are limited.  
Thus, with congressional involvement, professional athletes and states will be 
ensured that each state’s jock tax does not infringe upon the professional  
athletes’ constitutionally protected rights. 
Although the states implement the same allocation method to impose tax 
liability against professional athletes, inconsistencies still exist because states 
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do not agree on what constitutes a “duty-day.”  Further, the recent case law 
produced from the Ohio Supreme Court illustrates cities are still utilizing the 
games-played method.  As a result, professional athletes are being subjected to 
multiple allocation methods that could be inherently unconstitutional.   
Therefore, congressional action is needed to correct the inconsistencies that  
exist to ensure professional athletes’ constitutional rights are being protected. 
Overall, professional athletes will still have the daunting task of  
determining their tax liability for each state they visit.  Nonetheless, Congress 
can assist in alleviating this burden by developing a uniform allocation method 
to be used by all states and cities that levy a jock tax.  Especially since states 
and cities have shown no sign of lessening their enforcement of the jock tax, 
Congress should formulate a resolution as soon as feasibly possible.  
 
